Libya presents a complex calculus, with questions far outnumbering any possible answers at this premature stage.
1. Are the stated coalition objectives genuine?
2. Do the majority of Arabs support, or merely tolerate?
3. Do they perhaps support the stated humanitarian objectives of the UN resolution, but mistrust the ulterior motives of the Western powers fronting the assault on Gadafi?
4. Is the West caught in another trap between good intentions and noble rhetoric on the one hand and cold hearted “real politique” on the other?
5. Is this again about oil?
6. Is the coalition military campaign truly impartial?
7. How is the stated demand for Gadafi’s immediate departure reconciled with the proclaimed impartiality and non-interference in the internal affairs of Libya or in the unfolding “civil war”?
8. Is this truly a civil war, or just a popular uprising brutally crushed by the Libyan government?
9. Would the legitimacy or eventual scope of foreign intervention perhaps depend on the answer to this last question [8]?
10. Will the coalition avoid a military engagement on the ground under any circumstance, or would they rather avoid, but potentially find themselves drawn into another adventure?
11. Might the coalition consider arming the rebels if there is a stalemate and particularly if answer to question [10] is that they will definitely avoid a deployment of ground troops?
12. Would such potential decision (to arm or otherwise directly support the rebels) not amount to direct interference in the country’s internal affairs, beyond the humanitarian mandate? Might attempting to dress it up a “necessary means” for achieving the humanitarian mandate simply cost the coalition its credibility and undermine Arab tolerance (or support)?
13. Is the West considering a scenario where direct interference in the country’s internal affairs could be contemplated? A scenario perhaps of “dictated democracy” designed (and imposed from) abroad?
14. Is the call on Gadafi to cease fire a realistic (or even genuine one) when there is no evidence that (a) the assault on his authority by the rebel forces is not likely to abate and (b) there is no other apparent exit made available to Gadafi, other than continuing the fight? Is this perhaps as (or nearly as) impossible a request as the request on Sadam to deliver up and destroy his WMDs which he no longer possessed?
15. If the answer to question [14] is that this is indeed an impossible (or unrealistic) demand, is it then the case that the demand is made in ignorance of the impossibility or in full knowledge thereof?
16. If the answer to question [15] is that it is that the demand made in full knowledge of the impossibility thereof, is it perhaps the intention to use the necessary (and accurately predicted) non-compliance as an excuse for intensifying the assault and for directly interfering on Libyan affairs, with the aim of imposing a puppet regime, that will be totally dependent financially on foreign support, which will become necessary for rebuilding Libyan infrastructure as a result of the intensified assault caused by Gadafi’s non compliance to the impossible demand?
The questions certainly abound. But here are some thoughts:
1) There is apparent tension between the obvious desire of the West to interfere (provided it is not perceived as interfering) and the clear UN mandate to not interfere.
2) There is also a clear risk that the Western powers use the humanitarian mandate (to protect civilians) as a means for engaging in indirect (or direct) interference, by stopping the advance of the Gadafi forces on humanitarian grounds, which might in fact conceal more straightforward strategic objectives (if Misrata or Bengazi had been allowed to fall, the opposition movement would have been all but dead). The temptation to do so, might jeopardize the legitimacy of the operation and might cause the Arab support (or tolerance) to dissipate.
3) The West initially assumed that Gadafi would go quickly the same way as Mubarak. They (and specially the French) rushed to burn their bridges with him. He who was rehabilitated and accepted as a business partner, now became an outcast “who kills his own people”.
4) Gadafi in turn managed to rally support (with bribes, threats or otherwise) and he managed to make this seem more like a “civil war”, than seemed the case in the beginning, and not just like another popular uprising against an isolated dictator.
5) Air strikes may have stopped Gadafi’s advance and counter offensive but have not solved the problem.
6) If Gadafi doesn’t go as quickly as everyone hoped, Libya is facing de facto partitioning. De facto partitioning means indefinite uncertainty and instability. Bad for business, bad for oil.
7) Therefore, a reasonably quick resolution is required.
8) There is evidence that within the rebel ranks there are Muslim fundamentalists.
9) Points [7] and [8] in the light of the possibility described in point [6] and given the unwillingness of the coalition to engage ground troops, present an obvious dilemma: How to force Gadafi out reasonably fast, without directly interfering (or without being seen to directly interfere) and how, if interference is inevitable, to do so without arming the rebels, or at least without arming the “wrong” rebels.
10) A stalemate will force the coalition into further action not initially anticipated and not expressly endorsed in the UN resolution, when such action becomes “necessary” for forcing a “reasonably swift” resolution.
11) There is already talk by Western powers that the UN resolution can be interpreted more widely and that on the back of said resolution it is permissible to the West to arm the rebels, even though the UN has imposed a weapons embargo on Libya. The argument is that the West interprets this to mean that the embargo is imposed on the government not the rebels, and that arming the rebels falls within the “necessary means” for averting a humanitarian catastrophe.
12) This is no doubt a slippery slope. It brings memories of 2003 when another UN resolution was liberally interpreted to suit the US and its allies against the true and express intentions of the UN. It would also clearly lead to escalation of the fighting and to an escalation of the civil war and would cause even more civilian casualties, on both sides. But clearly the coalition is not really concerned about the civilian casualties but about getting rid of a regime with which it hurriedly severed its ties, and which stands in the way of further reform of the near and middle East. The next piece of the domino has to fall if the momentum of reforms in the region is to be maintained.
13) Of course it is not entirely clear if the West wish this momentum to be genuinely maintained, but in case it is, it is important for the West to be seen to be supporting democracy and to be distancing itself from regimes that were its puppets and partners in the region up until now. When the page of history is turned, the West will need to have a hold in the region. The West, it would seem, have assessed that the status quo is unsustainable in the region. So siding with the forces of the status quo would be unwise. This already cost the French foreign minister her post. She was too slow to disapprove the Tunisian dictator (when everyone thought that there was a chance he would stay in his post). The West has made the reverse error in Libya. They were too quick to demonise Gadafi and severe ties with his regime, on the assumption that he would fall quickly, making therefore his fall a necessity now for the West, even more so, than it is a necessity for the Libyan people themselves.
14) There is no doubt that the invasion in Libya is not about saving human lives. It is about real politique. It is about maintaining influence in the region, in and beyond Libya. It is about bringing much needed stability in the region, so that business and oil extraction can resume and so that the people feel they get a fair deal that will limit the radicalization of these populations and the feeding of the terrorist movement. It is a complex deal.
15) Not interfering in the way that the West has, would have jeopardized these paramount objectives. A potential humanitarian crisis would have cost the West influence. The West rushed to place a bet on the rebels winning. So, crucially, a rebel defeat (which seemed imminent hours before the air strikes) even if it ensued without any major humanitarian catastrophe, would have equally cost the West, as for the West there was clearly no going back to doing business “as usual” with Gadafi (once they rushed to sever ties with his regime), and yet they do need to have some trusted and cooperative regime to do business with.
16) On the outset the cost-benefit analysis was (marginally at least) in favour of intervention (also for internal political reasons in Washington and in other Western capitals). But this comes with huge risks. Further intervention might backfire. Doing too much might be as bad as doing too little. Arab tolerance might dissipate, human casualties might multiply, radicalization might be enhanced and the “wrong” radicals might be armed. There is a clear risk that the West might lose all influence in Libya and suffer a diminution of its broader influence in the region, if things go wrong, by doing “too much”.
17) Burning all bridges with Gadafi was unwise and premature. Allowing him no safe passage will also be wrong. Cornering him into a fighting position where he will have no option but to fight to death for his survival will be wrong. Because in such scenario the West will be drawn in to do more than it should. And doing so, will almost certainly backfire.
18) But even if Gadafi goes tomorrow, there is no knowing what will follow. And what is now happening behind the scenes or what happened in the London summit is clearly the most crucial part of this puzzle.
19) Let’s hope things will go to plan, but being duped into thinking that this is a moral intervention (compared and contrasted to the Iraq war) is naïve. There is only one fundamental difference. The Iraq invasion was opportunistic and ill conceived. This is less opportunistic and much better conceived and orchestrated. But it is no more moral, nor driven by genuine altruism. International law is still likely to be the victim, in much the same way as so many civilians on the ground are always the victims.
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